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I. Introduction
For more than a decade, sexual harassment in the workplace has
been recognized as discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Conduct which has "the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment" is a violation of Title VII.2 Although sexually harassing
conduct in public workplaces invariably takes the form of words or
pictures, until recently, such conduct has not been viewed by either
the courts or commentators as raising First Amendment concerns.3
"If ever words have been understood as acts, it has been when they
are sexual harassment. . . . [S]exual harassment has never been
imagined to raise expressive concerns, although all sexual harassment
is words, pictures, meaningful acts and gestures."4 It became an issue
of First Amendment speech, however, when women asserted that por-
nography in the public workplace constituted sexual harassment in
employment.5
While sexually derogatory comments and acts directed towards
women have repeatedly been found to be a sufficient basis for a hos-
tile work environment claim,6 pornography depicting the same degra-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(e-17) (1988).
2. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1994).
3. CATHARiNE A. MAcKNNON, ONLY WoRDs 45 (1993). But cf. Doe v. University
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the University of Michi-
gan's policy against discriminatory harassment of students was invalid because it covered
"verbal conduct" protected as speech under the First Amendment).
4. MAcKiMON, supra note 3, at 45.
5. Id at 52.
6. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988) (verbal abuse and
offensive touching sufficient to constitute hostile work environment for female traffic con-
trollers on a road construction site); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (extremely
vulgar and offensive epithets directed at plaintiff, as well as a work environment full of
dation has been defended as protected expression.7 In Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,' the employer argued that the posting of
demeaning and objectifying photographs constituted protected
"speech," and therefore prohibiting such material as a remedy for a
hostile work environment exceeded the court's authority.9 "Suddenly,
because [the Robinson plaintiff's] sexual harassment complaint cen-
tered on pornography, her sexual harassment claim invoked the First
Amendment, at least so far as relief was concerned."1
While pornography in the public workplace has begun to raise
First Amendment concerns, most commentary and jurisprudence have
focused on the restriction of verbal speech or the posting of sexually
explicit material in the workplace.'1 Arguments have been made that
such conduct in the workplace may be constitutionally restricted. 2
This Note advocates the extension of those arguments to workplace
regulations that prohibit the private reading and consensual sharing of
sexually explicit material. It proposes that the government as em-
ployer may restrict even private consumption of pornography for the
purpose of ridding the workplace of discrimination. The recent deci-
sexual slur, insult, and innuendo, sufficient to sustain claim of sexual harassment); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (sexual inquiries and vulgarities combined
with requests for sexual favors constitute hostile environment); Zabkowicz v. West Bend
Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 789
F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986) (verbal sexual abuse, posting of offensive drawings, and indecent
exposure constitute hostile environment).
7. See infra notes 8-9, 64 and accompanying text.
8. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
9. 11L at 1486. In Robinson, the employer argued that the First Amendment prohib-
ited any injunctive relief requiring the implementation of a sexual harassment policy which
prohibited sexually-oriented material in the shipyard. The court, however, did not find this
argument persuasive. As is discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this Note,
the Robinson court found that the First Amendment did not prohibit such injunctive relief
because, inter alia: (1) the Shipyard did not seek to express itself through the sexually-
oriented pictures or verbal harassment; (2) such verbal conduct and pictures were discrimi-
natory conduct constituting a hostile work environment and were therefore unprotected;
(3) the regulation of such material is nothing more than a valid time, place, and manner
regulation; (4) female workers in the shipyard were a captive audience to the speech; and
(5) even if protected, the compelling governmental interest in workplace equality justified
a sufficiently narrow regulation. IL at 1434-36.
10. MACKMnNON, supra note 3, at 53.
11. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceloa Refin-
ing Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Amy Horton, Comment, Of
Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassmen* the First Amendmen4 and
the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 403 (1991); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as
Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Omo ST. L.J.
481 (1991).
12. See infra notes 167-204 and accompanying text.
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sion in Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department,13 which
struck down a sexual harassment policy prohibiting private consump-
tion of pornography in county firehouses, will provide the basis for
discussion.
Part II of this Note reviews the basic tenets of First Amendment
jurisprudence, and discusses the implications of workplace restrictions
generally and sexual harassment policies in particular. Part HI ana-
lyzes the Johnson decision in light of these tenets. Finally, Part IV
proposes that private consumption of pornography can be constitu-
tionally restricted to further the government's compelling interest in
eradicating workplace discrimination.1 4
II. The First Amendment: Restrictions on Speech in the
Workplace
A. The Foundation of the First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech."' This prohibition is considered
"the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of
13. 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
14. For the purposes of this Note, I use the definition of pornography used by Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon-the "graphic sexually explicit subordination of wo-
men" through either pictures or words. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323,324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). This definition was included in a
proposed Indianapolis ordinance that attempted to define pornography as a civil rights
violation. Id The full definition includes "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women through pictures and/or words that also includes one or more of the following: (i)
women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) wo-
men are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are
presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women
are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt;
or (v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission, servility or display; or (vi)
women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks-are ex-
hibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as
whores by nature; or (viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or
inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual." Id at
324.
In fact, a similar definition was incorporated into a court-mandated sexual harassment
policy prohibiting the "reading or otherwise publicizing in the work environment materials
that are in any way sexually revealing, sexually suggestive, sexually demeaning or porno-
graphic" and used as an example of "sexually suggestive" a picture "depict[ing] a person
... who is not fully clothed ... and who is posed for the obvious purpose of displaying or
drawing attention to private portions of his or her body." Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1542.
By either definition, Playboy magazine would be considered pornographic.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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freedom," 16 and Americans have come to treasure this guarantee as
an absolute right of citizenship. Indeed, Justice Black supported the
idea of freedom of speech as an absolute right,17 but it has never
gained acceptance from a majority of the United States Supreme
Court. As an absolute right, freedom of speech would not be subject
to balancing,' 8 but the Court has consistently employed a balancing
approach in evaluating the constitutionality of some restrictions on
speech. The Court has explained:
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech.., as protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, [is] "absolute[ ]" ....
[T]his Court has consistently recognized [that] constitutionally
protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited li-
cense to talk.... [C]ertain forms of speech, or speech in certain
contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional
protection.19
The Court has developed several tests to evaluate restrictions on
speech. The overbreadth doctrine prohibits regulations permissibly
suppressing some speech from encompassing other speech that is con-
stitutionally protected. It seeks to ensure that statutes are drafted as
narrowly as possible. A law that "does not aim specifically at evils
within the allowable area of [government] control but, . . . sweeps
within its ambit other [protected expression]" will be struck down as
overly broad.20 Even if the state is pursuing an otherwise permissible
end, the statute must not abridge more speech than is necessary to
accomplish the objective. 2'
In addition, the Court will examine a regulation to determine if it
is content neutral. Content neutral is defined as "justified without ref-
erence to the content of the regulated speech"22 and reflects the belief
"that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea sim-
ply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."2 3
16. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
17. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
18. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrTiONAL LAW § 16.7, at 942
(4th ed. 1991). A balancing approach requires that the free speech value be weighed
against the government's justification for the regulation. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792 (2d ed. 1988).
19. Konigsberg, 366 U.S, at 49-50 (citations omitted).
20. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (holding that a statute which pre-
vented all picketing was void on its face because it also banned peaceful picketing pro-
tected by the First Amendment).
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
22. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
23. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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As one commentator has explained, "a regulation of speech based on
its content or its communicative impact is unconstitutional unless it
falls within one of a limited number of exceptions to the rule that
government may not prohibit speech because it does not like the
message."' For example, a regulation that allowed public discussion
in general but specifically prohibited public discussion of all religious
matters would violate the requirement of content neutrality. Under
the categorical balancing approach, however, even content regulation
has been allowed in circumstances such as the advocacy of unlawful
conduct,25 libel,26 obscenity,2 7 and "fighting words."2
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the regulation must be
viewpoint neutral; that is, it must not differentiate between points of
view on a particular subject. For example, a regulation that granted a
public park use permit to a Catholic organization but denied one to a
group of Jehovah's Witnesses would violate viewpoint neutrality.29
Viewpoint discrimination is "censorship in its purest form," and regu-
lations found to discriminate on that basis are traditionally subjected
to the highest level of scrutiny.30
These tests were developed in the context of the government as
lawmaker. They are also considered, however, when courts examine
regulations promulgated by the government as employer in restricting
a public employee's speech in the workplace.
24. Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free
Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NoTRE DAmE L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1993).
25. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
26. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
29. Gerard, supra note 24, at 1008. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992),
the Court struck down a city ordinance which prohibited the display of a symbol "which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id. at 380. In the majority
opinion, Justice Scalia struck down the ordinance in part because he found that it was not
viewpoint neutral:
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are per-
missible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.
Those who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection with other ideas-to express
hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality-are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul
to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects.
Id. at 391.
30. TRIE, supra note 18, § 12-3, at 800 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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B. Restrictions on Speech in the Public Workplace
Under some circumstances, the workplace speech of public em-
ployees may be restricted more than other speech.3 1 Indeed, despite
requirements of content and viewpoint neutrality, when the govern-
ment is the employer, workplace restrictions on speech have been
upheld.32
Clearly, there is a difference between government as lawmaker
and government as employer. As employer, the government may be
able to enforce restrictions on speech in the workplace that Congress
could not impose on the general citizenry without violating the First
Amendment.33 In Pickering v. Board of Education34 the Court noted,
"the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connec-
tion with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.' '35 None-
theless, the Court has refused to carve out a categorical exception to
the First Amendment which would permit unfettered regulation of
workplace speech when the government is the employer.36
Public employees do not relinquish their First Amendment right
to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government em-
ployment.37 The Court has employed a balancing test to determine
when the "interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern [outweigh] the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees."3 If the employee's speech relates to a
matter of public concern, a court must balance the employee's free
speech rights against the government-employer's interest in workplace
efficiency. If, however, the "employee['s] expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other con-
31. Private employers may regulate employee speech because doing so implicates no
"state action" to trigger the protections of the First Amendment. "[l]t is, of course, a
commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgment by government, federal or state." Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,513 (1976).
32. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974) (upholding the dismissal of an employee for false accusations of bribery against co-
workers); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding the court martial of an officer
who advised troops to disobey an order to report for combat duty).
33. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886, 1888 (1994); see also Gerard, supra note
24, at 1034.
34. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
35. Id at 568.
36. Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1820-21 (1992).
37. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
38. Id.
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cern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide lati-
tude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. '39 Restated, if a public
employee's speech does not relate to a matter of public concern, the
employer has considerable latitude to implement workplace restric-
tions on such speech.40 Absent extraordinary circumstances, if an em-
ployee is speaking on matters of a personal nature, a "federal court is
not the appropriate forum in whidh to review the wisdom of a person-
nel decision."41
The threshold question is whether the speech relates to a matter
of public concern. 2 A "matter of public concern" has been inter-
preted to mean an "expression relat[ing] to some issue of interest be-
yond the employee's bureaucratic niche. '4 3 The determination must
be made in light of the content, form, and context of the expression.4
For example, a public letter written by a teacher criticizing a tax in-
crease proposed by the school board 45 and a remark made by an em-
ployee indicating that she hoped the next attempt on the President's
life would be successful46 were both found to be matters of public con-
cern.47 An office questionnaire concerning office policies and morale
within a district attorney's office, however, was found not to be a mat-
ter of public concern. 8
If a public employee's speech is found to be a matter of public
concern, the court must evaluate the government's interest in an effi-
cient workplace to determine the constitutionality of the restriction.49
39. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
40. Id
41. Id. at 147.
42. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,384 (1987) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
43. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1273 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), afJ'd in part and rev'd in part, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
44. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
45. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70.
46. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386-87.
47. See also Beckwith v. Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
that statements regarding fire and rescue services made by an employee of the fire depart-
ment during a city council meeting were matters of public concern); Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d
255 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that public statements by a university athletic director regard-
ing violations of athletic rules were matters of public concern).
48. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148; see also Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985) (holding that an FBI agent's complaints about the
Agency's furlough program were not matters of public concern because they "would [not]
enrich the public's store of knowledge on the operation of the FBI").
49. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. In making this determination, "pertinent considerations
[include] whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-
workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loy-
Consistent with First Amendment principles, however, restrictions on
speech in the workplace may take many forms once the employer's
interest in an efficient workplace outweighs the employee's interest in
free speech. Some restrictions may be aimed at employee safety and
productivity, while others may work to promote morale.5 0 Restric-
tions on speech that are aimed at reducing sexual harassment, how-
ever, present a difficult question.
C. Sexual Harassment: The Hostile Work Environment
Sexual harassment falls into two categories, only one of which has
First Amendment implications. The first, quid pro quo harassment,
consists of demands for sexual favors in return for job benefits. 1 Such
"speech" is effectively extortion, and therefore does not enjoy First
Amendment protection.52 Similarly, physical conduct lacking any sig-
nificant speech component is also unprotected, 53 as is physical conduct
that conveys a message but may itself constitute a crime.54
The second category, hostile work environment harassment, oc-
curs when "sexual antagonism [is] so pervasive that it alters the 'terms
and conditions of employment' within the meaning of the statute. 55
It is a violation of Title VII if the sexual harassment is "sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment.' '5 6 Consistent with
this definition, an abusive or hostile working environment may exist
before the abuse is severe enough to drive the employee from the
job,5 7 and the harassing conduct need not be psychologically injurious
alty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or
interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (citing
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73).
50. See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562,1567 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding
that efficient police operations and employee morale outweighed employee's First Amend-
ment interest in criticizing his superior); McMullen v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937, 944 (M.D.
Fla. 1983) (stating that "internal discipline and strong morale in a law enforcement agency
is essential for the efficient operation of that agency"), affd, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985).
51. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
52. Gerard, supra note 24, at 1006.
53. Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986) (employee awoke from
a nap to discover a supervisor's hand on her crotch, and was ordered to leave the door
open when using the bathroom); Mitchell v. OsAir, 629 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(supervisor urinated in front of the employee).
54. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986) (free speech not impli-
cated in closing a bookstore where customers engaged in illegal sexual activity).
55. Gerard, supra note 24, at 1005; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
57. See id at 64.
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to the plaintiff to be actionable.58 Infrequent, isolated insults, how-
ever, generally do not create an abusive or hostile working
environment.5 9
Unlawful harassment can also be established by demonstrating
that the challenged behavior is "disproportionately more offensive or
demeaning to one sex."' 60 Such conduct "creates a barrier to the pro-
gress of women in the workplace because it conveys the message that
they do not belong, that they are welcome in the workplace only if
they will subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes prevalent in
that environment."'61 Whether the environment has risen to such a
level is measured from the perspective of a reasonable person of the
victim's gender,62 and must be determined by looking at all the
circumstances. 63
This category potentially raises First Amendment concerns be-
cause regulations aimed at preventing a hostile work environment
may attempt to regulate noncriminal speech that reflects an idea or a
viewpoint. This intersection between an employer's responsibility to
eliminate a hostile work environment and an employee's First
Amendment guarantee of free speech was the central issue litigated in
Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department.'
I. The Court's Decision in Johnson v. County of Los
Angeles Fire Department
A. Factual Background65
In July 1992, the County of Los Angeles Fire Department
promulgated a written policy to battle sexual harassment in the de-
partment. The policy prohibited sexually-oriented magazines in all
work locations, including dormitories, rest rooms, and lockers, even
though the physical layout of the firehouse is such that it is possible
for firefighters to read material either in their private bunks or in the
relaxation area without exposing the contents to an unwitting on-
58. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Meritor, 427 U.S. at 67.
60. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
61. Id. at 1523.
62. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
63. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
64. 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
65. This factual outline is summarized from the published opinion, Johnson v. County
of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1434-35 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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looker.66 The plaintiff, a male firefighter who had been with the Los
Angeles County Fire Department for some twenty-seven years, filed
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the policy violated
his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. He sought a declaratory judgment
that the policy, as applied to the private possession, reading, and con-
sensual sharing of Playboy in the firehouse, was unconstitutional.
Several female employees testified at trial that they found the
presence of magazines with nude pictures to be offensive and degrad-
ing, and that the lewd comments and gestures the men made while
reading the magazines offended them. Two other female firefighters,
however, testified that they were not offended. The drafter of the pol-
icy testified that one of her primary reasons for including the clause
banning the reading of sexually-oriented magazines was her "fear that
individuals reading such magazines would develop negative feelings
toward their female coworkers." 67
Against this factual background, the Johnson court analyzed the
constitutionality of the policy by applying the Pickering-Connick-
Rankin balancing test developed to evaluate restrictions on the speech
of government employees. 68
B. The Pickering-Connick-Rankin Balancing Test
The court recognized that the threshold question in the Pickering-
Connick-Rankin balancing test is whether the restricted speech relates
to a matter of public concern.69 If the speech component is a matter
of public concern, the court must balance the interest of the plaintiff
in exercising his right to free expression against the interest of the
government employer in maintaining efficient operations. If the
speech is not a matter of public concern, however, the employer has
considerable latitude to establish restrictive policies.70
In its decision, the Johnson court followed a broad interpretation
of what constitutes a matter of public concern. Stating that the maga-
66. Section III.C of the policy stated, in pertinent part: "The following types of sexual
material are prohibited in all work locations, including dormitories, rest rooms and lockers:
... Sexually-oriented magazines, particularly those containing nude pictures, such as Play-
boy, Penthouse and Playgirl." Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1434.
67. Id. at 1435.
68. Id.
69. Johnson, 865 F. Supp at 1435 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)).
70. Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 142); see also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
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zine "contains articles relating to politics, sports, arts and entertain-
ment... [and] contains stories by prominent authors and interviews
with public figures," the court held that Playboy "amply satisfies the
. . . standard that it relate to 'any matter' of concern to the
community.27
1
The court's characterization of Playboy as a matter of public con-
cern is questionable for two reasons. First, as one commentator has
suggested, the proper focus for the court's analysis should have been
whether the plaintiffs speech was a matter of public concern. That is,
the court should have examined the plaintiff's actions of private con-
sumption and consensual sharing for its public concern component,
and should not have focused on whether Playboy contained material
that is a matter of public concern. 72 In the context of public employ-
ment, speech which does not have social or political change as its goal
is afforded less protection.73 Furthermore, speech by public employ-
ees that addresses individual personnel disputes or grievances, and
which does not seek to inform the public of information necessary for
the "public's evaluation of the performance of government agencies,"
is not a matter of public concern.74 Matters of public concern have
traditionally been restricted to information that is needed by the pub-
lic to make "informed decisions about the operation of their govern-
ment. '75  In Pickering, the employee's comments regarding the
proposed tax increase were "vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate" over the expenditure of funds by a public agency.76 In
Beckwith v. Daytona Beach Shores, the firefighter's public comments
addressed the city's delivery of basic fire and rescue services,77 and in
Hall v. Ford, the employee's speech covered rule violations useful to
the public in evaluating whether the university was mismanaging the
athletic program.78 The Johnson court itself cited cases in support of
71. Id. at 1436.
72. Margo L. Ely, Plaintiff Improperly Stripped of Right to Read Playboy, Court Rules,
Cm. DAILY L. Buu.L., Feb. 13, 1995, at 6.
73. Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 1987) (reaffirming the principle
that speech on public issues occupies the "highest rung of hierarchy of First'Amendment
values") (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)); see also
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
74. Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing McKinley v. City of Eloy,
705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
75. Id. But see National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1003
(1995) (holding that speeches given by government employees outside the workplace on
topics unrelated to their employment were matters of public concern).
76. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
77. Beckwith v. Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995).
78. Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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its own public concern argument that involved speech classified as a
matter of public concern precisely because it conveyed information
necessary to evaluate the performance of government.79 In contrast,
because an FBI agent's comments regarding the agency's furlough
program did not contribute to the public's knowledge regarding the
workings of the agency, it was not a matter of public concern. 0 Fur-
thermore, at least one court has considered whether the employee's
speech was "specifically and purposefully directed to the public" in
deciding the issue of public concern.81 The plaintiff in Johnson ex-
pressed no such goal for his private consumption of pornography at
work. His speech made no contribution to the public's knowledge of
the workings of the fire department, nor did he direct his speech at the
general public, and therefore it should neither be classified nor pro-
tected as a matter of public concern.
Second, even if the Johnson court's public concern analysis was
properly focused on Playboy, Waters v. ChurchillF holds that an em-
ployee may be discharged for speech that is disruptive or is not a mat-
ter of public concern even if that speech includes statements that are
nondisruptive and addresses matters of public concern.83 Even if the
articles contained in Playboy somehow satisfy the public concern cri-
teria, the nude photographs included within its pages surely do not.
Following Waters, the fact that the non-public-concern pornography is
surrounded by material that may be eligible for heightened protection
does not mean that the entire magazine cannot be constitutionally re-
stricted in the workplace.
79. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1436 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (citing Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that com-
ments regarding the wisdom of agency procedures is a matter of public concern); Hyland v.
Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2337 (1993) (holding
that a memorandum exposing agency abuses, inefficiency, and incompetence was a matter
of public concern because "[s]uch issues are of vital interest to citizens in evaluating the
performance of the government")).
80. Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050
(1985).
81. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1115. But see Gillette, 886 F.2d at 1197 (stating that the fact
that the speech was not directed to the public at large was not critical to the inquiry of
whether the speech involved a matter of public concern).
82. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
83. Id. at 1891 (upholding the discharge of an employee based on disruptive state-
ments even though they were but a portion of a conversation that may have included mat-
ters of public concern). Arguably, the legitimacy that the articles in a magazine such as
Playboy give to pornography makes Playboy even more insidious, and ultimately more
effective in communicating its message of inequality, than hard-core magazines that make
no attempt to appeal to a more sophisticated audience.
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Having determined, however, that the restricted speech was a
matter of public concern, the Johnson court weighed the plaintiff's
First Amendment rights against the County of Los Angeles' interest in
an efficient operation. In measuring the plaintiff's First Amendment
rights, the court factored in the time, place, and manner of the restric-
tion, as well as whether it was a content-based regulation.8
The court found the policy a particularly onerous time, place, and
manner limitation because it prohibited reading during otherwise un-
restricted time. 5 The Johnson court stated that "an employee's right
to freedom of expression is entitled to a great degree of weight when
the speech occurs during the employee's free hours.18 6 The issue as
framed by the court was whether the reading interfered with official
duties, not whether the firefighters were being paid by the County
while reading.87 The court concluded that the policy was particularly
limiting because the plaintiff worked long shifts and the firehouse ef-
fectively became the plaintiff's home, and "because it leaves open no
opportunity for plaintiff's reading of Playboy at any point while plain-
tiff is on duty."'
The court then evaluated whether the policy was a content-based
restriction on speech. In doing so, the court noted that the policy
banned magazines which were "sexually oriented, especially those in-
cluding nude pictures," and did not apply to other types of magazines
which have a different orientation.89 Reflecting the opinion that har-
assmelit law in general is content-based because it suppresses some
kinds of speech and not others,90 the court found that the policy was
"undoubtedly content-based," and rejected the County's argument
that the policy was content-neutral because it regulated "secondary
effects." 91
To assess the government's interest in an efficient operation, the
court evaluated the County's evidence of disruption in the workplace
84. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1437-38.
85. Id. at 1438. For an argument that the policy is a valid time, place, and manner
restriction, see infra notes 220-241 and accompanying text.
86. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1437 (citing Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir.
1989) (police officers disciplined for owning video store with pornographic videos)); see
also Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)
(police officer disciplined for blackface performance).
87. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1438 n.2.
88. ILd. at 1438.
89. Id. at 1436.
90. Volokh, supra note 36, at 1826.
91. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1437. For an argument that the policy does not offend the
requirement of content neutrality, see infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text.
and required that the County bear the burden of justifying the policy
on legitimate grounds.92 The court summarized the governmental in-
terest as the eradication of sexual harassment in the workplace, and
required that the County's evidence of disruption in the workplace be
sufficient to prove that the policy furthered this compelling interest.
Alleging the need to prevent sexual harassment would not be enough,
the court required the County to show that real, not imagined, disrup-
tion had been threatened.93 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
government had not met its burden.94
The County's evidence of disruption fell into three categories.
First, the County presented evidence that female firefighters were of-
fended by the presence of Playboy. The court, however, stated that
the testimony was insufficient to establish that Playboy is offensive.
Though the women testified that they were "offended by seeing pic-
tures of nude women inside and on the cover of certain magazines,"95
the court concluded that the women really meant that they were of-
fended because they believed the male firefighters might be forming
degrading and abusive thoughts towards them. 9 6 The court rejected
this argument, saying that Title VII protects individuals from hostile
and abusive conduct, and because thoughts are neither comments nor
actions, they are outside the scope of Title VH.97
Second, the County presented testimony from several women
that they were uncomfortable with such magazines in the workplace,
that the magazines made, them feel unwelcome at work, and that the
presence of the magazine interfered with their ability to do their job.98
Unlike the Robinson court, which found that pornography may make
women feel unwelcome in the workplace and thereby create unlawful
harassment,99 the Johnson court did not find the women's testimony
of exclusion persuasive. The women also disliked the lewd comments
men made while reading the magazines, and they were offended by
"graphic sexually explicit nude photographs on the cover." 00 The
court responded that because Playboy has no nudity on the cover the
question is whether "mere exposure to the cover of Playboy directly
92. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1436. See infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
93. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1439 (citing McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1115(9th Cir. 1983)).
94. Iad at 1442.
95. IM at 1439.
96. Id
97. Id at 1440.
98. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1439.
99. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
100. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1439 n.4.
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contributes to a sexually harassing atmosphere."'' ° Again, the court
reasoned that the women were really complaining about the com-
ments and gestures made by the male firefighters while reading the
magazine. As the plaintiff did not seek to make comments, display
pictures, nor read magazines with nudity on the cover, the court con-
cluded that the conduct the women complained about was effectively
regulated by other provisions of the County's policy.'02
Finally, the County argued that the magazine influenced the way
male firefighters treat female firefighters. A County expert testified
that the reading of the magazine may result in "sex-role stereotyping"
by the men that results in unequal treatment or sexual harassment.10 3
The court rejected both the testimony and the rationale. Questioning
whether or not the elimination of stereotyping was a permissible ob-
jective, the court found that the County did not carry its burden of
showing that reading Playboy actually leads to sex-role stereotyping.
It rejected the testimony of the County's expert, saying the studies on
which his testimony was based were inconclusive and factually dissimi-
lar to the case before them.' °" The court relied instead on the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's expert that the "connection between Playboy
and 'sexual stereotyping' is not a scientific probability, much less a
scientific certainty.' 0 5 The court also found that the County was at-
tempting to alter the reader's viewpoint through regulation, and that
this was particularly offensive to the First Amendment. "[The
County] may not proscribe the communication of 'sex-role stereotyp-
ing' simply because [it] disagree[s] with the message. "106
Beyond the questionable substitution of the court's beliefs for the
women's testimony, the Johnson court should have been more defer-
ential to the County's evidence of disruption. The Johnson court's re-
quirement that the County show that pornography in the workplace
caused "real" disruption is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding
that "substantial weight [is given] to government employers' reason-
able predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a
matter of public concern."'1 7 Waters again draws the distinction be-
tween the government as employer and the government as sovereign,
and notes that the Court has been deferential to predictions of harm
101. Id. at 1440.
102. Id.
103. Id at 1441.
104. IM
105. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1442.
106. Id at 1441.
107. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994).
when the government is acting as employer. °8 Indeed, the harm may
be only speculative, and may not threaten present interference with
the agency's operation.10 9 While the Court recognized that in some
instances a substantial showing of likely disruption would be required,
it nonetheless urged a deferential approach in reviewing a government
employer's predictions of harm." 0 Even if the Johnson court's char-
acterization of Playboy as a matter of public concern is correct, the
County's evidence that some women found it offensive, that some wo-
men felt that the presence of pornography interfered with their ability
to do their job, and that some experts believe that sex-role stereotyp-
ing induced by pornography results in sexual harassment, should have
been sufficient to satisfy the deferential standard urged in Waters, and
establish that the disharmony among coworkers created by the pres-
ence of pornography compromised workplace efficiency.
In summary, the Johnson court upheld the plaintiff's First
Amendment claim because it found that the County had not over-
come the constitutional barrier to content-based restrictions on
speech, and because the County failed to establish that sexually ex-
plicit material in the workplace compromised workplace efficiency by
contributing directly to a sexually harassing environment."' The
court, however, also noted:
A different case would be before the Court if the defendants
had presented persuasive evidence establishing that the mere
sight of a Playboy magazine pose[d] a direct offense to women.
If defendants had presented evidence that the sight of the Play-
boy logo causes a shock to women as, for example, the sight of a
swastika may cause to a Jewish person or a racial epithet may
pose to an African American, defendants would have taken the
first step in showing that the quiet reading of Playboy contrib-
utes to a sexually harassing atmosphere."'
The Johnson court, however, failed to include the harm of pornogra-
phy in its evaluation of the County's evidence and, ultimately, in its
own constitutional balance. Arguably, this harm constitutes the kind
of "direct offense" required by the Johnson court to justify regulation.
When this harm is included, several arguments suggest that pornogra-




111. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1442.
112. Id. at 1440 n.7.
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IV. Arguments for the Constitutionality of Restrictions on
Pornography
The Johnson court indicated that if the County had established
that the "mere sight of a Playboy magazine poses a direct offense to
women," they would have balanced this interest against that of the
plaintiff.113 Relying on the absence of testimony that women found
the sight of a Playboy cover to be offensive, the court fountd that the
County failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that mere exposure
to the cover directly contributed to a sexually harassing atmos-
phere. 4 This approach, however, fails to take into account that the
existence of pornography itself, both in society and in the workplace,
inflicts harm on women.
This Part addresses the effect of this harm in determining the con-
stitutionality of the regulation. Section IV(A) summarizes the harms
inflicted on women by pornography. Section IV(B) outlines several
arguments suggesting that at least some pornography may be constitu-
tionally restricted even outside the workplace, and extends the argu-
ments to the restriction on private consumption at issue in Johnson.
Section IV(C) suggests three interpretations supporting the constitu-
tionality of the County's restriction on sexually explicit material in the
workplace.
A. Harm of Pornography
The word pornography is derived from the ancient Greek words
porne and graphos. While graphos refers to writing, etching or draw-
ing, porne means whore. As Andrea Dworkin explains, pornography
is "writing about whores. 1" 5 Pornography "does not mean 'writing
about sex' or 'depictions of the erotic' or 'depictions of sexual acts' or
'depictions of nude bodies' or 'sexual representations' or any other
such euphemism. It means the graphic depiction of women as vile
whores."11
6
The harm inflicted on women by this graphic depiction can be
summarized into five categories: 1) the causal connection between
pornography and increased violence against women; 2) the direct im-
pact that pornography has on women; 3) the harm pornography in-
flicts on women who are pictured in the pornography; 4) the
reinforcement and promotion of attitudes toward women that contrib-
113. Id.
114. Id at 1440.
115. ANDREA DwoRKIN, PORNOGRAPHY-MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 199-200 (1981).
116. Id. at 200.
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ute to' women's inequality in society; and 5) the harm perpetuated by
sexual stereotypes is reinforced by pornography, especially in the
workplace.
1. Causal Connection Between Pornography and Increased Violence
Against Women
Though subject to some debate, there are numerous studies link-
ing the viewing of pornography, especially violent pornography, to
sexual violence against women.117 Problems of multiple causation and
the difficulty of proving "conclusively" that such a causal link exists
may suggest that the downside risk of chilling pornography's speech is
simply too great. There will always be the question of how much
"proof" of how much "harm" is required before speech can be re-
stricted, but the identification of harm itself may not require such con-
clusive proof."' The Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography addressed the problem of multiple causation and the dif-
ficulty of establishing proof by recognizing that few causal links are
ever proven conclusively."19 The Commission rejected the notion that
a causal link must be proved "conclusively" before a harm could be
identified.' 20 It proceeded on the premise that a factor was a cause of
the consequences if the elimination of that factor, while everything
else stayed constant, would lessen the incidence of the
consequences.' 2'
Using the Commission's standard, numerous studies support a
causal link between viewing pornography and violence against wo-
men. The Commission itself found that "the clinical and experimental
evidence supports the conclusion that there is a causal relationship
117. For an extensive compilation of recent experimental research on pornography, see
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rv. 1, 52-53 nn.116-17 (1985). Note that the Johnson court found that the County had
failed to establish a causal link between reading Playboy and the poor treatment of female
firefighters. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1442.
118. In a recent decision upholding restrictions on lawyer advertising, the Court noted
that the government must demonstrate real harm to justify a restriction on commercial
speech. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2377 (1995) (citations omitted).
The Court found, however, that is was enough that the regulation "targets a concrete,
nonspeculative harm." Id. at 2378. In rejecting the dissent's criticism that the study sup-
porting the evidence of harm was flawed, the Court noted that it had previously upheld
restrictions on the exercise of free speech based on "simple common sense," even under a
strict scrutiny standard. Id. (citations omitted).
119. 1 ATrORNEY GFNERAi's COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 307 (1986)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
120. Id.
121. Id. at 310.
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between exposure to sexually violent materials and an increase in ag-
gressive behavior directed towards women... [and to] antisocial acts
of sexual violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful acts
of sexual violence."'1 22 Other studies suggest that exposure to violent
pornography increases a normal man's "immediately subsequent will-
ingness to aggress against women," and "significantly increases attitu-
dinal measures known to correlate with rape . . . such as hostility
toward women."" 3
Though less conclusive, there is also evidence that exposure to
nonviolent pornography that depicts degradation, domination, subor-
dination, or humiliation produces a similar result." 4 Significantly, the
Commission found that "forms of degradation represent the largely
predominant proportion of commercially available pornography" and
that it "constitutes somewhere between the predominant and the
overwhelming portion of what is currently standard fare heterosexual
pornography."" 25 Long-term exposure to nonviolent pornography
containing such degradation may make men view women as more
"worthless, trivial, non-human, and object-like,""26 and some women
report that nonviolent but degrading pornography is even more upset-
ting than violent pornography because its objectification of women
perpetuates a social structure of gender inequality." 7
The personal experiences of the victims of pornography help es-
tablish the causal link as well. An ex-prostitute testified that "[m]en
witness.., the abuse of women in pornography constantly and if they
can't engage in that behavior with their wives, girl friends or children,
they force a whore to do it.""-8 Women speak of the link between
their husband or boyfriend's use of pornography and their forced par-
122. Id. at 325-26.
123. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 53-54.
124. FINAL REPORT, supra note 119, at 332. The FmiNA REPORT recognized that "there
is less evidence causally linking the material with sexual aggression .... [but t]he absence of
evidence should by no means be taken to deny the existence of the causal link." Id. at 332.
It concluded that "substantial exposure to materials of this type bears some causal relation-
ship to the level of sexual violence, sexual coercion, or unwanted sexual aggression in the
population so exposed." 1d. at 333-34.
125. 1d at 331-32, 334-35.
126. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 54.
127. Note, Pornography, Equality, and a Discrimination-Free Workplace: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 106 HARV. L. Rnv. 1075, 1078 (1993).
128. Id. at 57 (quoting a woman who testified at hearings on an antipornography ordi-
nance proposed in Minneapolis). Transcripts of these hearings are on file with the Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, and are titled Public Hearings on Ordinances to
Add Pornography as Discrimination Against Women, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, City Council, Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 12-13, 1983).
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ticipation in sex acts.12 9 When asked if they had ever been subjected
to sex acts they did not want to engage in, and which they knew came
from pornography, ten percent of all women, and twenty-four percent
of married women, said yes. 130 Men may use pornographic material
"to strongly encourage, or coerce, [women] into engaging in sexual
practices in which they do not choose to engage."''
2. Direct Impact of Pornography on Women
Pornography has a direct and harmful impact on women as well:
Although much has been written and debated about the effects
that pornography has upon men's attitudes and behavior, pre-
cious little mention has been made in the legal literature about
pornography's direct impact on women. Nonetheless, evidence
available from women's own accounts of their experiences with
pornography indicate that pornography has a direct impact on
women, apart from the attitudinal changes it may cause in
men.
132
While some women assert that they find pornography "a source of
liberation and pleasure,"' 33 for many others it instills fear and humili-
ation.' 34 Furthermore, women identify with the subjects used to make
the pornography more frequently than men.' 35 Pornography is partic-
ularly devastating to victims of rape and child abuse, because it "vali-
dates and celebrates the criminal behavior of which they have been
victims."' 36 Finally, pornography directly harms women through its
depiction of them as sexual objects, thereby defining women's role in
society.' 37 Pornography in the workplace clarifies that their role is not
at work.' 38
129. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 56.
130. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 228 (1984).
131. FINAL REPORT, supra note 119, at 342-43.
132. Note, supra note 127, at 1077.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1078.
135. Id.
136. Id The author also notes that some studies indicate that the majority of women
have been raped or otherwise sexually abused. Id at 1078 n.26.
137. Note, supra note 127, at 1078-79.
138. For additional sources discussing the effect the consumption of pornography has
on women, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination,
71 B.U. L. RPv. 793, 801 n.18 (1991).
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3. Harm to Women in the Production of Pornography
The making of pornography inflicts real harm on the women who
participate in its production.13 9 Many women are physically forced to
participate, and some are reportedly murdered to make "snuff" sex
films.' 40 Linda Marchiano tells of being abducted, beaten, and forced
to participate in the making of the movie "Deep Throat."'' While
not all women are physically coerced, the fact that "prostitution and
modeling are structurally women's best economic options should give
pause to those who would consider women's presence there a true act
of free choice."' 42 Perhaps an even greater harm to these women,
however, is the creation of a permanent record of their humiliation.
As one "porn star" explains, "[v]irtuafly every time someone watches
that film they are watching me being raped."' 4 3 Acknowledgment of
this type of harm helped to tip the balance in favor of the constitution-
ality of restrictions on child pornography.'"
4. Reinforcement of Inequality
By depicting the dominance and submission of women as desira-
ble and normal, pornography simultaneously sexualizes and reinforces
women's inequality. 45 Pornography inflicts harm by "thrusting upon
[women] insulting and degrading views of their societal roles and their
sexuality.... [and these] images carry over to a social structure of
gender inequality as a whole." 46 While the "connection between ine-
quality, unlawful discrimination, and pornography cannot be firmly
established[,] .. .pornography undeniably reflects inequality, and
through its reinforcing power, helps to perpetuate it." 47
139. Cass R. Sunstein, Notes on Pornography and the First Amendment, in Pornogra-
phy: Social Science, Lega and Clinical Perspectives, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 28, 31 (1986).
140. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 33. A "snuff" film is a sex film in which someone is
tortured to death. "In the movies known as snuff films, victims sometimes are actually
murdered." 130 CONG. Rnc. S13,192 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Senator Specter
introducing the Pornography Victims Protection Act).
141. L1NA LOVELACE AND Mnrn McGRADY, ORDEAL (1980).
142. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 33.
143. Linda Marchiano, testifying at Public Hearings on Ordinances to Add Pornogra-
phy as Discrimination Against Women, Committee on Government Operations, City
Council, Minneapolis, Minn. (Dec. 12-13, 1983) (quoted in MacKinnon, supra note 117, at
37).
144. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
145. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Sex Discrimination, in Pornography:
Social Science, Lega4 and Clinical Perspectives, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 38, 41 (1986).
146. Note, supra note 127, at 1078.




Finally, the presence of pornography in the workplace may rein-
force stereotypes about women that lead to impermissible sex discrim-
ination or create a hostile work environment. Sex-role stereotyping
was recognized as impermissible sex discrimination in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'48 The Court held that the employer had the
burden of proving that it based its decision to deny a woman partner-
ship on legitimate factors and not on any bias reflected by stereotypes
about women.149 While the decision addressed stereotypes that char-
acterized women as unsuitable for partnership because of traits that
were "too feminine" or "too masculine," Justice O'Connor noted in
her concurrence that though sex-stereotyped "stray remarks" may not
justify a requirement that the employer prove its personnel decision
was based on legitimate criteria, they may be probative of sexual
harassment. 50
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., an important case on
pornography and hostile work environment harassment, the district
court found in favor of the plaintiff who brought a hostile work envi-
ronment claim against her employer.' 5' The claim focused on the
"presence in the workplace of pictures of women in various stages of
undress and in sexually suggestive or submissive poses, as well as re-
marks by male employees and supervisors which demean women."152
The lengthy catalogue of harassing behavior, which the court ulti-
mately held constituted a hostile environment, included the reading of
pornographic magazines in the workplace.' 53
In so holding, the Robinson court accepted expert testimony sup-
porting the link between pornography and sexual stereotypes that can
lead to a "sexualized working environment [that] is abusive to a wo-
man because of her sex." 54 An expert in Robinson testified that the
"availability of photographs of nude and partially nude women" en-
148. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
149. Id. at 251-52.
150. l at 277 (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
151. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
It is interesting that the Johnson court makes no reference to the Robinson decision, not
even to distinguish it. While holding no precedential value over the Johnson court, it is
nonetheless an important decision on workplace pornography.
152, lid at 1490.
153. lId at 1494.
154. 1d at 1505. In fact, the expert in Robinson supported a portion of her testimony
that pornography in the workplace encouraged men to treat women coworkers as sex ob-jects on the same study rejected by the Johnson court. Id at 1503.
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hanced one of four preconditions that increase the likelihood that
harmful stereotyping will exist in a workplace. 155
While the factual circumstances of Robinson are not directly
analogous to those in Johnson, the rationale behind the decision is
applicable. In contrast to the Johnson court's rejection of expert testi-
mony linking pornography to discriminatory sex-role stereotyping, the
Robinson court, as part of the order and judgment, ordered the em-
ployer to implement the Shipyard's Sexual Harassment Policy,156
which included a prohibition against "reading or otherwise publicizing
in the work environment materials that are in any way sexually re-
vealing, sexually suggestive, sexually demeaning or pornographic."'1 57
In fact, one commentator contends that:
The Robinson court's decision that pornography in the work-
place created an abusive environment was based largely on the
notion that pornography in the workplace leads to sexual stere-
otyping by male coworkers. A female employee who accepts
this reasoning could well want to complain about a coworker
privately reading sexually explicit materials, even if she is not
herself exposed to their contents. And once the complaint is
made and proven, the company is bound by the court order to
discipline the offender. 15
Constraints on speech have been allowed in certain factual cir-
cumstances by including in the evaluation the harm inflicted by the
speech. Child pornography,159 the advocacy of illegal action,' 60 and
even the posting of election signs on public property, 61 have been
constitutionally restricted based, at least in part, on the harm that each
inflicts. 62 In light of the harm pornography inflicts on women, it may
be constitutional to restrict pornography even outside the work-
155. Id. at 1503 (referring to the precondition of priming). Another precondition was
rarity-few women in the workplace compared to the number of men-which is also pres-
ent in County firehouses.
156. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1541.
157. Id at 1542.
158. Volokh, supra note 36, at 1815 n.106 (citation omitted).
159. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
160. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
161. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Though the case was analyzed under a public forum rationale, the Court considered the
visual blight created by posting signs on utility poles to be a harm that the community had
a substantial interest in eliminating.
162. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that many harm-based restrictions on speech
have been found constitutional based on much less evidence of harm than is available to
support the harm of pornography. See MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 28-31. In order to
be constitutional, she asserts, the restricted speech must inflict harm "that counts." Id. at
28.
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place.163 Within the workplace, where the government as employer
has both the compelling interest of eradicating workplace discrimina-
tion and the flexibility to impose restrictions on speech to facilitate
workplace efficiency, restrictions on pornography may be even easier
to justify as consistent with the First Amendment.
B. Constitutionally Permissible Restrictions Outside the Workplace
While efforts to restrict the production and distribution of por-
nography have met with little success' 14 and generated considerable
debate, particularly within the feminist movement,'165 several argu-
ments suggest that at least some pornography can be restricted
outside of the workplace without offending the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech. This Section will outline these arguments
and extend their application to the sexual harassment policy struck
down in Johnson.166
1. Low-value Speech
Professor Cass Sunstein suggests that pornography is "low-value"
speech, and can therefore be regulated without demonstrating a com-
pelling government interest. 67 He argues that speech which has little
to do with public affairs is accorded less protection, and that therefore
pornography is not the kind of speech traditionally protected by the
163. See infra notes 164-204 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
165. See, e.g., Joan Kennedy Taylor, Does Sexual Speech Harm Women? The Split
Within Feminism, 5 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 49 (1994).
166. Some of the harms described in the previous section may not apply with equal
force to pornography of men. For example, it may not be true that a causal link exists
between pornography of men and violence against them, and, arguably, pornography of
men cannot reinforce stereotypes of inferiority that do not exist. Therefore, a harm-based
rationale for restricting pornography in the workplace may not be as persuasive when ap-
plied to the pornography of men. Nonetheless, a policy which prohibited pornography of
women, but allowed pornography of men, may raise questions of viewpoint neutrality, and
both the low-value speech and captive audience arguments discussed below suggest that
pornography of men could be constitutionally restricted even without a harm component.
The presence of homosexual pornography raises similar questions, though it is difficult to
imagine that male firefighters would not claim they were harmed by a gay firefighter read-
ing male pornography at work. In fact, it is equally difficult to imagine that the firefighters
would support a lesbian firefighter who sought to read Playboy. The Johnson decision
addressed none of these issues, and this Note focuses its analysis, as did the Johnson court,
on the plaintiffs "quiet possession, reading and sharing of Playboy magazine." Johnson v.
County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1442 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
167. Sunstein, supra note 147, at 602-08.
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First Amendment.16 When combined with the harms it produces,
regulation is justified.169 While conceding that the line between
speech that is protected and that which is not protected may be diffi-
cult to draw, he suggests that materials that promote sexual arousal
rather than deliberation on public or private issues fall outside of
traditional First Amendment concerns. 70
This low-value argument has been reflected in the Court's juris-
prudence as well. In arguing for what amounts to a sliding scale of
First Amendment values, Justice Stevens upheld zoning restrictions on
adult bookstores and movie theaters.' 7' Justice Stevens found that the
state may legitimately use the content of sexually explicit material as a
basis for denying some movies the same protection as others.172 In so
holding, Justice Stevens stated, "it is manifest that society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.' 173 Sim-
ilarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,74 Justice Stevens found that a
radio broadcast of "offensive and indecent" material was a far cry
from core political speech, and as such was unprotected when it was
broadcast in a time slot in which it was accessible to children. 75
While recognizing that even offensive words may be protected in
some instances, the Court held that the level of protection need not be
the same in every context.1 76 Finally, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc. ,177 the Court upheld a restriction on nude dancing even though it
found it to be expressive conduct.178 The Court found the nude danc-
ing was "within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,
although only marginally So." ' 1 79
168. Id. at 603-04. Commercial speech is another example of speech that receives lim-
ited protection because of its "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment val-
ues." Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
169. Sunstein, supra note 147, at 608.
170. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 29.
171. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In discussing this sliding
scale, one commentator notes that "adult materials and other offensive speech [are] near
the bottom of this scale." She notes that Justice Stevens's abandonment of content neu-
trality has not been expressly adopted by a majority of the Court. Cynthia L. Estlund,
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Cate-
gory, 59 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1, 21 (1990).
172. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 70-71.
173. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
174. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
175. Id at 747-48.
176. Id. at 746-47.
177. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
178. Id at 565, 572.
179. Id at 566 (emphasis added).
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When applied to the Johnson decision, the low-value rationale
suggests that a workplace is exactly the context in which low-value
speech is unprotected. Despite the Johnson court's categorization of
Playboy as a matter of public concern for the purposes of the Picker-
ing-Connick-Rankin balancing test, it is debatable whether the pri-
mary purpose of the magazine's sexually explicit photos, cartoons, and
jokes is to further discourse and discussion of public matters or to
produce sexual arousal and stimulation. Surely such material does not
qualify as core political speech. Simply because the magazine contains
an occasional article without sexually explicit material does not mean
that its primary speech is not sexually arousing "adult entertain-
ment."'180 While a magazine of mixed content may fall within the cate-
gory that Sunstein identifies as troublesome outside the workplace,
within the workplace, where wider latitude is given to employers to
restrict the speech of employees, and where achieving equality is a
compelling government interest,' 8' the primarily low-value content of
Playboy suggests it may be constitutionally restricted.
Indeed, a restriction justified on the low-value rationale need not
make a distinction between private consumption and public display of
pornography. If pornography falls outside of the rigorous protection
provided core political speech, an employer need not provide a com-
pelling justification for its decision to restrict pornography. Given the
harms of pornography and the nature of firefighting as a traditionally
male occupation, the County's concern that the mere presence of por-
nography contributes to a sexually harassing environment amply satis-
fies this lowered standard.
2. Child Pornography
An analogy to child pornography suggests a second argument. In
New York v. Ferber,'82 the Court upheld a criminal ban on child por-
nography because the state had a right to prevent the harm it inflicted
on children, even though the material did not satisfy the Miller ob-
180. The Johnson court stated that the plaintiffs First Amendment rights were not di-
minished by the sexually-oriented nature of the material. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1438
n.3. It cited for support, however, two cases outside of the employment context. Id.
181. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
182. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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scenity standard.8 3 This harm included a "permanent record of chil-
dren's participation," which is "exacerbated by circulation."'"
That pornography directly "harms women's opportunities for
equality and rights [of all kinds]" has been recognized. 185 Nonethe-
less, courts have refused to extend the Ferber protection to pornogra-
phy of women, finding that the harm itself proved "the power of
pornography as speech" and therefore justified its protection under
the First Amendment. 186
This novel approach seems to equate the harm inflicted with the
value as speech: the more harm, the more valuable the speech. The
refusal to apply the Ferber reasoning to the pornography of women,
however, overlooks an important analogy' 87 to the Equal Protection
Clause 188 as interpreted by the Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion."'89 In Brown, the Court found that racial segregation perpetuated
feelings of inferiority in African American children. 190 Pornography
harms a group of people in a similar manner by "reinforcing the view
that [the group's] members are inferior and worthy of mistreat-
ment."19' Following Ferber's rationale, the First Amendment would
not be violated by restricting the production and distribution of por-
nography in order to prevent the harm it inflicts on women.
The idea that women need protecting in the same way that chil-
dren do has been criticized as paternalistic.192 Certainly there is a dis-
183. Id at 755-56. In 1973, the Supreme Court adopted a "test" for identifying obscene
material: "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the 'average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest .... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
184. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
185. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985), affd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
186. Id.
187. Note, supra note 127, at 1083.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
189. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning the constitutionality of segregated schools based
in part on the lasting harm inflicted on African American children by "separate but equal"
schools).
190. Id. at 494. See TRME, supra note 18, § 12-5, at 821 (stating that the Court invali-
dated segregation because it "unavoidably communicated a social message of [B]lack
inferiority").
191. Note, supra note 127, at 1084 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 138, at 812-13).
192. Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce, et aL, in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. Mic. J.L. Rr. 69
(1988). "[T]he [Indianapolis] ordinance perpetuates a stereotype of women -as helpless
victims, incapable of consent, and in need of protection." Id. at 130.
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tinction between a child's and a woman's capacity to consent. Even if
women do not need protection from being unwilling participants, 93
however, the pornography of women harms not only those women
involved in its production, but all women in society through its
message of inferiority and reinforcement of social inequality. Women
have little ability to consent to or prevent this harm once the pornog-
raphy is distributed. If restricting pornography is viewed as granting
relief from discrimination and providing a measure of social equality,
rather than expressing the view that women cannot make choices for
themselves, the restrictions are no longer "special protection."194
There are probably few places in which the social inequality of
women is more pronounced than in traditionally male-dominated
fields such as firefighting. 95 If Ferber is extended to the pornography
of women, restricting the presence of pornography in the County's
firehouses is easily justified and supports the County's claim that the
private reading of pornography contributes to a sexually harassing at-
mosphere. Having recognized that material which is not obscene may
be restricted to prevent harm to a group of people, prohibiting por-
nography in the County's firehouses presents no substantial First
Amendment problems once courts acknowledge the harm that por-
nography inflicts.
3. Silencing of Women
Examining the values and principles behind the First Amendment
suggests a third argument for the constitutional restriction of pornog-
raphy. If the goal of the First Amendment is to encourage public dis-
course by ensuring that citizens are free to exercise their right to free
speech, then a careful balance is required between one person's exer-
cise of that right and the prevention of others from fully exercising
theirs. 96 The silencing argument proposes that pornography can be
193. But see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
194. Note, supra note 127, at 1085 ("To protect women from the terrorization of por-
nography is thus to grant them relief from discrimination, and social equality, rather than
'special protection' in the paternalistic sense.").
195. The expert who testified in Robinson identified rarity as one of four preconditions
that enharice the negative effects of stereotyping on women in the workplace. The social
inequality reflected in sex stereotyping can result in "'sex role spillover,' where'the evalua-
tion of women employees by their coworkers and supervisors takes place in terms of the
sexuality of the women and their worth as sex objects rather than their merit." Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1503 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
196. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the FCC's
fairness doctrine requiring licensees to make free reply time available). But see Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
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restricted because it prevents women from exercising their right to
free speech by devaluing what women have to say. By reinforcing
inferiority, subordinate status, and inequality, pornography effectively
silences women. 97 In doing so, it undermines the very values that the
First Amendment is designed to protect. 98
Traditional thought maintains that when society is faced with po-
tentially harmful or offensive speech "the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence."' 99 By conditioning society to the
inferiority of women, however, pornography ensures that when wo-
men do engage in "more speech" to counter the effects of pornogra-
phy, their voices will be denied "credibility, trust, and the opportunity
to be heard-the predicates of free expression. '' 200 Pornography itself
is "inconsistent with rectifying or even counterbalancing its damage
through speech.... Pornography strips and devastates women of cred-
ibility, from our accounts of sexual assault to our everyday reality of
sexual subordination. We are deauthoritized and reduced and devali-
dated and silenced."201 It is argued that racist speech silences minor-
ity groups in much the same manner: "[n]ot only does racist speech,
by placing all the credibility with the dominant group, strengthen the
dominant story, it also works to disempower minority groups by crip-
pling the effectiveness of their speech in rebuttal. '20 2 Through its sex-
ualization and reinforcement of inferiority, and its portrayal of women
as primarily sexual objects, pornography ensures that women's voices
on any topic will be consumed by the dominant one. In doing so,
pornography effectively decreases the total amount of speech in the
marketplace.20 3
wholly foreign to the First Amendment"). The Buckley holding, however, ignores the im-
portant role that wealth and property ownership play in securing a "voice" in our society.
In effect, the Court already "enhance[s] the relative voice" of some at the expense of
others through its many decisions perpetuating property rights and private or corporate
wealth.
197. For analysis of this argument, see Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First
Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1887, 1907-09 (1992).
198. The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (quoted in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
199. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) overruled
in part on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
200. Sunstein, supra note 147, at 619.
201. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 63.
202. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 385 (1991).
203. Charles R. Lawrence, HI, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuK LJ. 431, 468 (1990) (arguing that racist speech reduces speech by
coercively silencing members of the targeted groups).
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This silencing may be especially pernicious in a traditionally
male-dominated occupation such as firefighting. Male resentment to-
ward women in the field and a woman's desire to fit in make it un-
likely that women will be able to engage in speech that counters the
presence of pornography. This enforced silence means not only that
women's objections to the presence of pornography in the workplace
will be ignored, but that women's input into policy decisions and
workplace issues may also be devalued and "silenced."
The Johnson court could have upheld the County's ban on por-
nography in the workplace by recognizing that the silencing effect it
has on a woman's right to free speech outweighs any value promoted
by protecting it. While it may be difficult to prove that pornography
chills women's expression, it is equally difficult to prove that legiti-
mate speech would be suppressed by restricting pornography. This
difficulty of proof, however, has not prevented the proponents of por-
nography from arguing that pornography deserves protection. 04
Without reaching the question of whether the County had established
that restricting pornography furthered its goal of eliminating sexual
harassment, the court could have recognized that by suppressing the
speech of women throughout society, pornography itself is inconsis-
tent with the values the First Amendment is thought to protect. Such
an argument does not exclude private consumption from regulation,
for pornography accomplishes its silencing effect even when women
are not forced to look at it. Its existence alone is sufficient to alter the
marketplace of ideas to disadvantage women's speech. A nation com-
mitted to equality in the workplace cannot rely on such a marketplace
to achieve that goal.
C. Constitutionally Permissible Restrictions Within the Workplace
The recognition of a hostile work environment based on the pres-
ence of pornography in the workplace has focused primarily on situa-
tions where sexually explicit material has been posted in common
areas.20 5 Johnson, however, concerns private reading and consensual
sharing of sexually explicit material, and disinterested workers are not
forced to look beyond the titillating cover of the magazine. This dis-
tinction is of little importance, however, because pornography is ob-
jectionable in the workplace not because it may be offensive to some,
but because of the harm inflicted on women through its production
204. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 337(1984).
205. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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and distribution. Eliminating pornography in firehouses will an-
nounce that the government recognizes the injury inflicted by pornog-
raphy and will not condone the discrimination it perpetuates.
Citizens do not forego their First Amendment rights entirely by
choosing to work for the government. °6 As Pickering, Connick, and
Rankin suggest, however, the government as an employer, rather than
a legislature, may restrict employee speech in ways it could not restrict
citizen speech generally.20 7 Furthermore, the government-as-em-
ployer's interest in an efficient workplace has almost always carried
more weight than an employee's free speech rights. 208 This Note pro-
poses that once the personal and societal harm of pornography is in-
cluded in the constitutional balance, the government as employer may
restrict even private consumption of pornography to rid the workplace
of discrimination because, beyond the justifications articulated above
in Part IV(B): (1) it is a permissible time, place, and manner regula-
tion; (2) women at the firehouse are a captive audience to the pres-
ence of the pornography; and (3) pornography is not protected by the
First Amendment because it subordinates women and is discrimina-
tion per se.
1. Time, Place, and Manner Regulation
In balancing an employee's speech interest against an employer's
interest in an efficient workplace, a court must consider the extent of
the regulation. Regulations that prohibit certain kinds of discrimina-
tory speech in the workplace may be valid if they are nothing more
than a time, place, and manner regulation of speech.20 9 However, a
"constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may
not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech." '
As outlined in United States v. O'Brien,2'1 a restriction on speech
that is consistent with the First Amendment as a permissible time,
206. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
207. Gerard, supra note 24, at 1033.
208. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994); see also Horton, supra note 11, at
422-23. Horton notes that "although the background assumption is that public employees
have free speech rights that can be overcome only where the government's interest as
employer is quite strong, just the opposite turns out to be true in practice." Id at 423.
209. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535. See also, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388
(1987).
210. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). Accord
Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) ("For a time, place, or
manner regulation to be valid, it must be neutral as to the content of the speech.").
211. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
place, and manner regulation must be (1) content neutral,212 (2) serve
a legitimate government interest unrelated to the suppression of
speech, and (3) be narrowly tailored to accomplish this interest.
These restrictions are permissible because "banning sexist speech in
the workplace does not censor such speech everywhere and for all
time., 213
Antipornography legislation and sexual harassment laws have
been attacked as incompatible with the First Amendment because
they are not thought to be content or viewpoint neutral.214 The Hud-
nut court found the Indianapolis ordinance to be "thought control,"
for it decided what the socially acceptable view of women would be
and sought to enforce this view through law, to the exclusion of others
holding a different view.215 The Robinson court, however, rejected
the Hudnut approach urged by the defendant,216 and found that even
though such regulations are not entirely content neutral, they do not
offend constitutional principles because of the "distinction based on
the sexually explicit nature of the pictures and other speech."2 7 The
Johnson court, following the Hudnut approach, found the policy "un-
doubtedly content-based"21 and attempts to restrict the thoughts men
may form about women while reading the magazine to be impermissi-
ble thought control.21 9
These arguments can be rebutted in several ways. First, every
antidiscrimination law expresses the view that practices reflecting dis-
criminatory ideas are illegal-laws prohibiting segregation are not im-
permissible thought control simply because they express the view that
racial minorities are not inferior to whites.220 Similarly, "pornography
is identified in part through its content, but regulated through its
212. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
213. Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 46
(1990).
214. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Gerard, supra
note 24, at 1009-10; Volokh, supra note 36, at 1854-55 n.277.
215. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 33. But see CAmT-RiNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMmrIsT THEORY OF THE STATE 213 (1989) (stating that "[in Hudnut t]he Court saw legal
intervention against acts ... as 'point of view' discrimination without doubting the consti-
tutionality of state intervention against obscenity, which has no connection with acts and is
expressly defined on the basis of point of view about sex").
216. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1536.
217. lId at 1535 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) and
Sunstein, supra note 147, at 616-17).
218. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1436.
219. Id at 1442.
220. MacKinnon, supra note 138, at 812.
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acts." 221 Antipornography legislation is not aimed at restricting ideas,
but at restricting harm. It does not seek to establish a government-
sanctioned view of women and censure those who disagree. The goal
of antipornography regulation is to prevent real harm to women.222
Consistent with the First Amendment, courts may balance this harm
against any value pornography has as speech.
Second, the Supreme Court has indicated that even when the
government appears to be making distinctions based on content, such
distinctions may be permissible when the material is considered in the
context of its surroundings.2 In his concurring opinion to American
Mini Theatres, Justice Powell noted that the government "can tailor its
reaction to different types of speech according to the degree to which
its special and overriding interests are implicated." 4 In a male-domi-
nated firehouse, where the effects of pornography may be especially
effective in making women feel unwelcome, and given the govern-
ment's compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination, 225
the government may be able to make even content-based restrictions
to achieve this "special and overriding interest."
Finally, the Court has upheld restrictions based on secondary ef-
fects. 6 Though the Court has held that a government body cannot
rely on the "secondary effects" doctrine when the secondary effect is
the emotive impact of the speech,2 7 if the secondary effect of pornog-
raphy is seen as the perpetuation of inequality, rather than controlling
221. Id. at 814-15.
222. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 33.
223. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 83 n.6 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (noting that zoning regulations prohibiting adult movie theaters were not an imper-
missible time, place, and manner restriction based on content because it was "merely a
decision ... to treat certain movie theaters differently because they have markedly differ-
ent effects upon their surroundings").
224. Id. (citing, inter alia, Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(holding that school officials could not ban the wearing of armbands protesting the Viet-
nam War when other political symbols were permitted, unless there was "evidence that it is
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline");
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (holding that prison officials could not
censor inmate mail unless the government could show that such regulation "furthers one or
more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation")).
225. See infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text.
226. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance
prohibiting adult movie theaters within 1000 feet of a residential zone based on the secon-
dary effect these theaters have on a residential neighborhood).
227. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down a regulation which prohibited
placing signs near foreign embassies which would offend the foreign governments).
men's thoughts, its regulation does not violate the requirement of con-
tent neutrality.228
Furthermore, Justice Souter's application of the secondary effects
doctrine in his concurring opinion in Barnes supports the regulation of
pornography in the workplace as an interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. In Barnes, the Court majority upheld
a state public indecency law requiring dancers to wear pasties and a
G-string. Deciding that nude dancing is expressive conduct "within
the outer perimeter of the First Amendment," the Court nonetheless
upheld the restriction and found that it did not violate the require-
ment of content neutrality because it sought to ban all public nudity,
not just public nudity that is combined with expressive activity.229 Jus-
tice Souter concurred, but for somewhat different reasons:
To say that pernicious secondary effects are associated with
nude dancing establishments is not necessarily to say that such
effects result from the persuasive effect of the expression inher-
ent in nude dancing. It is to say, rather, only that the effects are
correlated with the existence of establishments offering such
dancing, without deciding what the precise causes of the correla-
tion actually are.... Because the State's interest in banning
nude dancing results from a simple correlation of such dancing
with other evils, rather than from a relationship between the
other evils and the expressive component of the dancing, the
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.230
Similarly, pornography can be correlated with sexual harassment in
the workplace and therefore may be constitutionally restricted with-
out offending the requirement of content neutrality. In Johnson, the
County is regulating the workplace presence of the harm that is asso-
ciated with sexually explicit magazines, and the harm exists whether
the pictures are posted or viewed privately. Sexual arousal, presuma-
bly the expressive component of pornography, is neither directly regu-
lated by the County's restriction on sexually-oriented magazines in the
workplace, nor is it indirectly regulated as a secondary effect. Here,
228. See Keith R Fentonmiller, Verbal Sexual Harassment as Equality-Depriving Con-
duct, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 565 (1994).
While the "emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect,"'
the harm that hostile environment law seeks to eradicate is equality-deprivation,
not emotional distress. Thus, under the "secondary effects" exception, Title VII
imposes no unconstitutional restrictions on freedom of speech because it regu-
lates only the secondary, equality-depriving effects of sexually abusive workplace
speech.
Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
229. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1990).
230. Id. at 585-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
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the County is regulating a secondary effect that is associated with ex-
pressive content without requiring the expression to be the cause of
the harm.231 Following Justice Souter's argument, it does not violate
the requirement of content neutrality to restrict speech associated
with an evil that society has an interest in suppressing.
The second prong of the O'Brien test requires an, examination of
the government interest behind the regulation.232 In performing the
Pickering-Connick-Rankin balancing test, the Johnson court found
that the County failed to establish that its interest in an efficient work-
place surpassed the free speech rights of the plaintiff. 3 3 The proper
comparison, however, is not simply between the First Amendment
and workplace efficiency. A court evaluating a time, place, and man-
ner restriction on pornography in the workplace must also balance a
woman's right to equality in the workplace, and the government's in-
terest in eradicating workplace discrimination, against the plaintiff's
right to read material such as Playboy at work.
The Robinson court noted that the government's interest in the
"eradication of workplace discrimination is more than simply a legiti-
mate governmental interest, it is a compelling government inter-
est. '234 The Johnson court itself recognized that preventing sexual
harassment is a compelling government interest.23 5 While the sup-
pression of some "speech" may result from the County's restrictions
on pornography, the employee's speech interest must be balanced
against the compelling government interest of equality in the work-
place. Furthermore, the Court has shown a willingness to subordinate
First Amendment rights of association to the compelling state interest
of equality.3 6 In a traditionally male-dominated workplace, restric-
tions on pornography serve this interest by eliminating the discrimina-
231. See Sunstein, supra note 139, at 32 (stating that the harmful effects of pornography
are "usually a by-product rather than a purpose of pornography").
232. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
233. See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
234. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(citing Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,549 (1987) (eliminating discrim-
ination against women is compelling government interest); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (compelling government interest in removing barriers to
advancement for women)).
235. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
236. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (1984) (stating that Minnesota's interest in eradi-
cating discrimination against women justified restrictions on male Jaycee's freedom of as-
sociation). See also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting the
argument that application of Title VII to a law firm's decision not to offer partnership to a
woman because of her sex violated their freedom of association).
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tion inherent in the message of inferiority perpetuated by
pornography.3 7
Finally, the O'Brien test requires that a valid time, place, and
manner restriction be narrowly tailored to accomplish the govern-
ment's interest.238 Following the Robinson court's reasoning,239 the
County's regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored. The Johnson
court found the restriction particularly onerous because firefighters
are often at the station for several days at a time and because it ap-
plies during hours when the firefighter is on duty but not performing
assigned tasks. The regulation, however, need not be the least-restric-
tive means of accomplishing its purpose-it need only avoid a solution
that is "substantially broader than necessary to achieve the govern-
ment's interest."240 Given that women firefighters are also at the sta-
tion for extended periods and the work environment is created in part
by "otherwise unrestricted time," the regulation is tailored to control
that environment and eliminate barriers created by the presence of
pornography.
It may be argued that prohibiting private consumption goes far-
ther than is necessary. Such an argument, however, ignores the fact
that a more narrow restriction prohibiting only the posting of sexually
explicit material would be substantially less effective in achieving the
government's objective. A woman may not find that viewing pornog-
raphy in the workplace is offensive, but this does not diminish the
message of inequality that pornography reinforces. Moreover, the
County has not foreclosed the entire medium or method of communi-
cation; firefighters have not been entirely denied access to the speech
that pornography voices. Firefighters work an average of ten shifts
per month;241 in the remaining twenty days they are free to consume
pornography while not on duty in the County's employ.
As a narrowly tailored regulation aimed at eradicating workplace
discrimination, the County's restriction on sexually explicit material in
the workplace satisfies the O'Brien standard. Consistent with the First
237. The government as employer also has an interest in an efficient workplace. This
interest may not be compelling; nonetheless, efficiency must be given considerable weight
in determining the constitutionality of workplace restrictions on speech. Waters v. Church-
ill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994).
238. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
239. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
240. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
241. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
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Amendment, the restriction is a permissible time, place, and manner
regulation.
2. Captive Audience Doctrine
The captive audience doctrine is a "separate and distinct justifica-
tion for regulating speech. These regulations are promulgated to
cover situations in which an unwilling listener cannot avoid another's
speech."' 42 The doctrine provides that:
In public places an individual's privacy interests in avoiding of-
fensive communications are generally thought insubstantial un-
less the person is deemed a member of a "captive audience,"
either because the person is literally not free to leave without
great burden or because the person is in a place where there is a
basic right to remain and where one cannot readily avoid expo-
sure to the unwanted communication." 43
An audience is captive, however, "only when the speaker intrudes on
the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity makes it impracti-
cal for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." 244 Though
most frequently applied to prevent unwanted intrusions into the
home, the Court has extended the doctrine's protection to such audi-
ences as women seeking medical services at a health clinic245 and pas-
sengers on a public bus.246 The doctrine has also been applied in the
employment context. The Robinson court found the female shipyard
workers to be a captive audience to the speech comprising the hostile
work environment, and stressed that the "free speech guarantee ad-
mits great latitude in protecting captive audiences from offensive
speech."24 7 Apparently focusing on the fact that the sexually explicit
material was not posted in the firehouse, the Johnson court found that
the women firefighters were not a captive audience because they
could avoid the material by averting their eyes.2 48
242. Gerard, supra note 24, at 1030.
243. TRIE, supra note 18, § 12-19, at 949 n.24 (citations omitted).
244. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (citation omitted).
245. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) (holding that
targeted picketing of a health clinic threatened the psychological and physical well-being of
patients held captive by medical circumstances).
246. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding a city ban on
political advertising on public buses because passengers were a captive audience).
247. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535-36 (M.D. Fla.
1991); see also Jessica M. Karner, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REv. 637, 678-91 (1995) (arguing that a modified captive audience
doctrine should be applied in the workplace to help eliminate sexual harassment).
248. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1440 n.6.
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The rejection of the captive audience rationale is inappropriate
for two reasons. First, the "remedy" of averting one's eyes presup-
poses that the harm of pornography is in the viewing. The harm of
pornography and its ability to create a hostile work environment goes
beyond any offense or insult a woman may experience upon viewing
it. The very existence of pornography, its creation and distribution,
inflicts harm upon women and promotes inequality and thereby con-
tributes to a hostile atmosphere in which women may feel unwelcome.
A policy aimed at eliminating sexual harassment that relies solely on
individual initiative to avoid exposure is insufficient.
Second, while an individual in a public building may not be cap-
tive to offensive language,249 "[flew audiences are more captive than
the average worker."''- 0 Employees exert little control over their
workplace, and few are free to leave or restructure their jobs to avoid
unwanted exposure without jeopardizing their career.251  Further-
more, the fire station serves a dual purpose for its employees-while
clearly a workplace, even the Johnson court admitted that the fire sta-
tion was a de facto home to the firefighters.2-52 The captive audience
doctrine has protected individuals from unwanted intrusions into the
privacy of their home,253 and therefore the captive audience doctrine
supports the County's efforts to remove sexually explicit material
from the fire stations.
3. Pornography as Discrimination
The First Amendment need not protect "speech" that is itself dis-
crimination.25 4 Pornography in the workplace was traditionally
viewed as evidence of discrimination rather than discrimination it-
self.'55 This changed in Robinson, however, when the presence of
249. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
250. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535-36 (quoting J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Plu-
ralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKm L.J. 375, 423-24
(1990)).
251. See Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment No Collision in Sight, 47 RuTrGERs L. REv. 461,517-
18 (1995).
252. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1438.
253. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
254. Cf. United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1278 (2nd Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[S]peech is not protected by the First
Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself.")).
255. Note, supra note 127, at 1087.
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pornography alone was found to create a hostile work environment
for women. 256
The Robinson court recognized the equation of pornography and
sex discrimination in finding that the pictures and verbal harassment
present in the shipyard were "not protected speech because they act
as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environ-
ment. '257 Robinson supports the assertion that pornography is not
protected because it creates a sexually harassing atmosphere by its
presence and is therefore discrimination per se.25 8 "Potentially ex-
pressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their com-
municative impact.., are entitled to no constitutional protection." 59
The Robinson court factored the harm of pornography into its
constitutional balance, recognizing that even if pornography's
"speech" is fully protected, the court must balance the government's
compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against it.
Though the court-imposed sexual harassment policy included restric-
tions on private reading, the Robinson court found that the regulation
was narrowly tailored to accomplish this compelling interest, and
noted that other First Amendment rights, such as freedom of associa-
tion and the free exercise of religion have bowed to this compelling
government interest.260 The Robinson court also looked to public em-
ployee cases for support, stating that the employer's interest in disci-
pline and order in the workplace justifies restrictions if the employee's
speech undermines the morale of the workforce.261 Restrictions on
the expression of some employees in order to prevent or remedy the
harm that such expression inflicts on other employees does not neces-
sarily violate the First Amendment.262
Simply because an illegality takes a verbal or expressive form
does not mean it is protected:
One can express the idea a practice embodies. That does not
make that practice into an idea. Segregation expresses the idea
of the inferiority of one group to another on the basis of race.
256. Nell J. Medlin, Expanding the Law of Sexual Harassment to Include Workplace
Pornography: Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 21 STmrsoN L. REv. 661 (1992).
257. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
258. Id
259. Id (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)).
260. Id. at 1536 (citing Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,549 (1987)).
261. Id.
262. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535 (citing as comparison McMullen v. Carson, 568 F.
Supp. 937, 943-45 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (finding no First Amendment violation in discharge of
KKK member from police force because inter alia internal discipline and morale were
threatened by potential for racial confrontations), affd, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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That does not make segregation an idea. A sign that says
'Whites Only' is only words. Is it therefore protected by the
[F]irst [A]mendment? 263
Pornography is also not an idea, nor is it expression that deserves First
Amendment protection.2 1 Through its reinforcement of societal in-
feriority, pornography is equality-depriving conduct which the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in regulating.2 65 Just as laws against
segregation undermine the point of view contained in the practice of
segregation, so would the recognition that pornography is sex discrim-
ination work to delegitimize the ideas behind its message.266
V. Conclusion
"What matters for a legal system is what words do, not what they
say .... ,267 In a country where equality is guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, and in which eradicating workplace discrimination is a compel-
ling state interest, the First Amendment should not prohibit carefully
tailored regulations designed to eliminate "ideas" in the workplace
that are in reality acts which perpetuate and reinforce inequality. Had
the Johnson court included harm in its evaluation-the harm inflicted
on women who are unwilling participants in pornography, the harm
inflicted by the silencing of women's voices, the harm inflicted by por-
nography's message of inferiority, and the role of each of these harms
in keeping women out of male-dominated fields such as firefighting-
the constitutional balance would have permitted restrictions against
private consumption of pornography in the public workplace.
263. MacKinnon, supra note 117, at 65.
264. Fentonmiller, supra note 228, at 603. See also, Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,
470 (1973) ("Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protections.").
265. See Fentonmiller, supra note 228, at 599-603.
266. MacKinnon, supra note 138, at 813.
267. Edward J. Bloustein, Holmes: His First Amendment Theory and His Pragmatist
Bent, 40 RuToERs L. REv. 283, 299 (1988) (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes's approach
to freedom of speech).
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